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The Spy in Hitler’s Inner Circle: Hans-Thilo Schmidt and the
Intelligence Network that Decoded Enigma. By Paul Paillole.
Oxford, UK and PA: Casemate Publishers, 2016. ISBN: 978-161200-371-9. Glossary. Notes. Appendices. Pp. xvi, 272. $32.95.
First published in France as Notre Espion Chez Hitler in 1985, this Casemate
edition marks the first English translation of this important and highly
interesting account from French Intelligence officer Paul Paillole, who was
both a witness to many of the events described in his book and a participant
in several others. The book was written as a complement to Paillole’s earlier
work in which he detailed his personal role in the counterespionage activities
of the French Services Spéciaux from 1935 to 1945. The title of the book being
reviewed here might indicate a more restrictive perspective than the actual
scope of the story it tells. While decoding the Enigma machine occupies a
central place in it, there are other SIGINT and HUMINT aspects of equal
value and interest. It is a book that is instructive on several levels despite the
fact that the events took place up to eighty-five years ago. Some things, such
as intelligence community rivalries or the difficulties of dealing with human
sources will never change it seems.
The story revolves largely around the role of Hans-Thilo Schmidt and the
intelligence he supplied to the French not only about the German Enigma
codes, but about a host of other important issues bearing on Hitler’s evolving
plans to conquer Europe. Schmidt, known typically by his code names of H.E.
or Asché, was employed by the German cipher department, the Chiffrierstelle,
when he approached the French in 1931 with an offer to supply intelligence
about the Enigma machine. His motive, ostensibly, was money. The French
readily agreed despite not having a true appreciation at that early date for the
complexities of the new mechanical ciphers created by the Germans, or, for
that matter, how far advanced German cryptography was. Senior French
Intelligence officers wisely recognized immediately that they would be paying
not only for the services rendered and risks involved, but also for Schmidt’s
social standing and personality. In fact, Schmidt’s brother was the future
General Rudolph Schmidt, one of Hitler’s most trusted officers who would
command the 2nd Panzer Army later in the war.
The case officer assigned to Schmidt was another German citizen working for
the French and using the name Lemoine, code named “Rex,” who would meet
with Schmidt to obtain the information he provided, including daily Enigma
ciphers for certain months. Unable to shake the French Cipher Section of the
Army General Staff from its lethargy and ignorance of the threat presented by
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the complex German encryption capability, French Intelligence officers
passed the information on to the Polish Biuro Szyfrow, which was already
working diligently to understand the Enigma machine and its workings. With
the help of Schmidt’s pilfered ciphers, the brilliant Polish mathematician and
cryptologist Marian Rejewski was able to provide the calculations needed to
successfully replicate an Enigma machine in early 1933. Thereafter, work
began in earnest to develop further calculations that would enable the
machine to actually decipher intercepted German messages, but it was an
excruciatingly slow process that would only begin to come close to its goal in
1937 with the refining of an electromechanical process known as the “Bomba”
(59). The Poles’ work presaged the later successful efforts of British scientist
Alan Turing and his team at Bletchley Park (the subject of a 2014 movie
entitled The Imitation Game) in refining the Bomba, or Bombe, and
conquering the Nazi encryption process thanks, in large part, to Schmidt’s
ciphers.
Meanwhile, tensions in Europe led Schmidt to expand his focus from the
Enigma cipher settings, whose delivery had become routine, to a broader
mission of discovering the Nazi’s rearmament plans and future intentions.
Fortunately, Schmidt would gain a position at the newly created
Forschungsamt (FA), the Reich Air Ministry’s signals intelligence and
cryptanalytic office. He was able to inform the French that the FA was not
only monitoring internal phones and mail, and thereby helping to fill the
newly established camp at Dachau with Nazi opponents, but it was also
listening in on telephone calls to and from the French embassy in Berlin and
had cracked the French diplomatic code as well. Incredibly, within a few
years the FA’s interceptions along with French diplomatic carelessness could
have been Schmidt’s downfall. Meeting Rex in Switzerland in late 1937,
Schmidt was incensed that information he provided to the French embassy in
Berlin intended for French Intelligence had been viewed by diplomats. The
sensitive information that could potentially implicate Schmidt as the source
had then been transmitted to Paris via telegram using the long-compromised
codes. The FA intercepted the information, decoded it, and had it sitting on
Herman Goering’s desk within 24 hours. What most upset the spy, Paillole
contends, was not the risk of discovery, but “the flippancy with which his
warnings seem to have been received” (94). It is a theme that permeates the
book and is one of the lessons that may be taken from it. Valuable intelligence
from a proven source was often disregarded or questioned by those whose
actions could well have mitigated some of the consequences. Whether it was
flippancy, inter-office rivalries, or simply incompetence, the book details a
frustrating number of missed opportunities to negate or counter German
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initiatives. A clear example of this was provided during that same Swiss
meeting when Schmidt revealed a map produced by his brother, who was
himself alarmed by the audaciousness of its contents. It was a map depicting
Hitler’s plans for the gradual conquest of Europe between 1938 and 1948, and
it spared no country from the bold Nazi plans. Despite strong evidence for a
forthcoming German attack through Belgium, France’s National Defense
Committee members clung obstinately to their conviction that the Nazis
would obligingly hurl themselves against the vaunted Maginot Line.
Schmidt’s predictions about the fate of the Rhineland, Austria, and the
Sudetenland all proved precisely accurate between 1936 and 1938, yet no one
had the fortitude to stand up to Hitler. Sadly, the same tale unfolded in
Poland in 1939, but more telling was the Schmidt’s revelation earlier that year
that the FA was still easily deciphering French, British, and American
diplomatic messages, as well as those of the French Navy. Clearly, despite
having a well-placed source, the French and other allies were at a distinct
disadvantage by being their own worst enemies. Another issue that bears the
test of time was the fact that some Allied embassies neglected “the most
elementary prudence” (126) and continued to hire foreign staff. This was
especially problematic for the British and American Embassies in Italy, where
the Italians proved themselves to be good allies by providing Germany with
diplomatic codes stolen from those embassies.
One positive result of Schmidt’s dire warnings was increased cooperation with
the British. Paillole contends that the French brokered initial meetings
between themselves and British and Polish cryptographers in 1936, but that
initial cooperation on Enigma matters was minimal owing to each party’s fear
of divulging too much information about the status of their own work. The
increasing threat of National Socialist ambitions in Europe eventually led to
more congenial cooperation by 1938, and when Poland fell in September
1939, Rejewski and other Polish scientists escaped to France with two replica
Enigma machines. Thereafter, British efforts at Bletchley Park, stimulated by
the Poles’ contributions, were greatly energized.
Still, Schmidt’s final warning to the French in March 1940 regarding a spring
attack through the Ardennes, while not ignored, was interpreted far too
cautiously and thus deemed by the French General Staff to be much less likely
than an assault across the Belgian plain. At around the same time, the
Bletchley Park team had significantly decreased the time needed to decipher
Enigma message traffic and began providing timely intelligence. After a
setback in early May when the Germans modified procedures used in creating
the message keys, Turing’s team gained the advantage back and retained it
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throughout the war. Despite the absence of solid signals intelligence in May,
Schmidt’s warnings should have prepared the Allies had they only listened to
him. Instead, when General Rudolph Schmidt’s 39th Panzer Corps stormed
through the Ardennes as part of the Nazi invasion, Belgian, French, and
British forces were swept aside, unprepared for the speed and fury of an
attack from a direction deemed by the General Staff as impractical. Could the
fall of France, the frenzied evacuation at Dunkirk, or the 100,000 Allied
casualties be any more damning an indictment of the failure to properly
respond to good intelligence?
The rest of the story is equally sad. Through his own hubris and carelessness,
Schmidt’s case agent Rex was picked up in occupied France and began to
unburden himself to his German countrymen in an effort to save himself. In
that he was successful, but the Schmidt brothers fared less satisfactorily.
Hans-Thilo Schmidt was arrested in March 1943. By September he was dead,
whether murdered or by suicide is unknown. Rudolf Schmidt was relieved of
command of the 2nd Panzer Army in April 1943, after letters he wrote to his
brother revealed his vociferous criticisms of the Führer. Though he escaped a
disappointed Hitler’s full wrath, Rudolf met a dismal end after spending eight
years in the hands of the Soviets. Released in 1957, Rudolf settled into a
meager existence in a modest Berlin apartment, where he died two years later.
Paillole’s book will be of interest to historians and to intelligence
professionals alike, both of whom will garner a greater understanding of the
universally applicable benefits and pitfalls of the intelligence profession, as
well as an appreciation for its potential impact on the course of history.
Edward J. Hagerty, American Military University
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